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This research commentary proposes a 3-D implementation classification framework to assist service 
providers and business leaders in understanding the kinds of contexts in which more or less successful 
cashless payment solutions are observed at point-of-sale (PoS) settings. Three constructs characterize the 
framework: the digitalization of the local implementation environment; the relative novelty of a given 
payment technology solution in a country at a specific point in time; and the development status of the 
country’s national infrastructure. The framework is motivated by a need to support cross-country research 
in this domain. We analyze eight country mini-cases based on an eight-facet (2 x 2 x 2) classification. A 
key insight is the distinction between local and national environments for solution implementations, and 
that there are no objective “low-tech” or “high-tech” payment solutions, but only those that must be 
calibrated by a country’s experience at the national or local implementation environment levels. Our 
analysis also revealed that implementing cashless payment solutions is complex, with each country and 
local context having its own set of challenges. The proposed framework is a basis for policy-makers and 
payment service providers to develop insights related to the challenges of cashless payment solution 
implementation. Developing countries sometimes are able to leapfrog their legacy infrastructures by using 
mobile payment solutions, while developed countries must respect the importance of barriers to 
implementation success, such as costs, settlement delays, and the habitual use of cash. We further note why 
business leaders should consider their approaches to payment solutions in view of the different degrees of 
local digitalization and national infrastructure development to support tech innovations in their digital 
economies. 
Keywords: Cashless payments, classification, country facets, developing and developed countries, 
implementation environment digitalization, national infrastructure development, mini-case assessment, 
payment technology solutions, point-of-sale (PoS), technology solution novelty.  
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There has been increasing interest by many countries to implement more cashless payment solutions, 
for example, in Australia, Finland, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, among others (GlobalData 
2020). We define cashless payments as payment transactions that are made using digital payment 
instruments and digital interfaces, typically involving telecommunication and the Internet, resulting in the 
diminished use or displacement of physical cash.1 Countries are keen to displace cash to meet the G20 
countries’ financial inclusion goals to modernize their international financial architectures, as well as to 
reduce fraud and currency-related criminality. According to CapGemini (2018, 2019), switching to cashless 
payments also can boost a country’s annual GDP by as much as 3%. 
The financial services landscape has seen the rapid digitalization of payment solutions as a result of 
these and other forces. Digitalization is defined as:  
“a strategy or process that goes beyond the implementation of technology to imply a deeper, core change to the 
entire business model and the evolution of work.” It involves “the use of digital technologies and digitized data to 
impact how work gets done, transform how customers and companies engage and interact, and create new digital 
revenue streams.” 2 (Chapco-Wade 2018)  
Because it emphasizes an information-based transition that often causes business process disruption 
and industry transformation, moving toward cashless payments involves greater complexity for countries 
and firms that must undergo extensive changes – with no certainty of success (Clemons et al. 2017, Gomber 
et al. 2018, Kappelman et al. 2019).3 This is what has been happening with cashless payments in many 
countries, for example, Kenya in the past (Christensen et al. 2015), and most notably, Sweden, which is 
forecast to become a cashless society by March 2023 (Arvidsson et al. 2017, Hedman 2018).4 
 
1 The distinction between the terms cashless payments and digital payments is based on a technical consideration in how a payment 
transaction is made. With digital payments, the emphasis is on both the payment sender (payer) and payment recipient (payee) 
using a digital channel to send and receive value. Historically, the financial services industry referred to this category of payment 
transactions (as opposed to the use of physical cash) as electronic payments. Others give more care to the definition of digital 
payments. For example, the Better Than Cash Alliance (2020) of the United Nations distinguishes between: (1) “[the] nature of the 
payment instrument, [and] through which means – paper or digital – the instructions [are] carried”; and (2) the payer-payee 
interface, [and] whether the payee, payer or both use an electronic medium in a payment transaction.” In this work we use the 
terms digital payments and cashless payments interchangeably, but prefer the latter, and do not use electronic payments.  
2 Many professionals mistake the term digitization for digitalization. The former is narrower in scope: it means the process of 
converting analog content to computerized digital data. For additional background on the terms and their contrasts, see Brennen 
and Kreiss (2014). The knowledge on digitalization developed to date in research is discussed by Tallon et al. (2019), and current 
directions are showcased by ongoing special issue development at the European Journal of Information Systems, with the theme 
of “Digital-Enabled Strategic Agility: The Next Frontier” (Tallon et al. 2020, to appear in Spring 2022).   
3 The transformations that are underway are further discussed in terms of various issues by authors who have offered useful 
intellectual foundations for this research. They include coverage of macro-level issues: in the global digital economy (Tapscott 
1996); developing nations’ digital economy value creation and appropriation (UNCTAD 2019), as well as in Asia (Li et al. 2020) 
and in global trade (OECD 2020a); measurement of national digitalization via the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), the 
(European Commission 2019); and the impact of digitalization on national labor markets (DeGryse 2016).  
4 The move toward a cashless society has been ongoing across the globe for a number of years. The earliest evidence is from 
Sweden. In 1919, a committee appointed by the king suggested that Sweden should start a postal giro business to decrease the use 
of cash (Sveriges Riksdag 1919). Today, there is no such explicit aim expressed by the government. In fact, it has put new legislation 
in place to “protect cash,” but research shows that consumers (Riksbanken 2019) and merchants (Arvidsson et al. 2017) are 
abandoning it. Sweden, together with Finland, China, the U.K. and Australia, are top-ranked to become cashless societies the 
soonest. The cashless path is not uniform though. We can see both demand and supply-side paths. In Sweden, the demand side 
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In addition, large technology companies, such as Ant Financial, Tencent, Facebook, Apple and Google, 
attracted by the potential for revenue growth, have entered the payment services market. Global payments 
services revenues, as a result of the widespread demand for innovative services, reached USD 1.5 trillion 
in 2019, and are expected to grow by 67% to USD 2.5 trillion by 2028. This will partly be driven by the 
move away from cash toward cashless payments around the world (Malhotra et al. 2019). 
Developed countries often have to contend with the challenges of rolling out novel and high-tech 
payment solutions in locally low-digitalization implementation environments though. This is because 
typical retail settings such as shopping malls, supermarkets and restaurants have already been converted to 
cashless payment mechanisms through credit and debit cards (KPMG 2016). Thus, the focus for cashless 
payment implementation has shifted to locations where the purchase amounts are smaller in value and cash 
has been the predominant payment method, such as in outdoor food courts in Singapore where inexpensive 
meals are sold (Tung 2016). In these places, business processes usually are not very digitalized. Such 
payment solution implementation settings resemble locations in developing countries like Kenya, with its 
dark and cramped shop spaces, cluttered store-front table-tops, itinerant retail staff with limited education, 
and the presence of only basic utilities (e.g., electricity, gas, water) (Ng and Tan 2016).  
Cashless payment implementations in such settings present unique challenges though it also represents 
an opportunity: such locations are a final frontier for cashless payment solution implementation in a 
developed country’s effort to create a cashless society. Singapore is an example of a country that aims to 
go cashless (albeit not by 2025) – with an already well-developed national infrastructure. However, some 
of its local payment solution implementation environments are far less digitalized than what one may expect 
with the advanced infrastructure of a developed nation. 
Similarly, developing countries such as Thailand and India have also been seeking to establish cashless 
payments capabilities (CGAP 2019, Desai 2019). How different are their experiences with specific cashless 
payment solution implementation initiatives compared to those of developed countries? We discuss a 
classification approach that is based on different levels of novelty for payment technology solutions that 
were implemented in the presence of different degrees of national technology infrastructure, as well as 
contrasting levels of digitalization of the local retail implementation environment, and the novelty of the 
payment technologies and processes used. Consumers, meanwhile, have been turning to new technologies 
for greater convenience with money in their everyday lives. For example, 64% of Southeast Asian 
consumers have indicated that they are comfortable with going cashless for a day (Visa 2019). This 
 
(consumers or merchants) is gone and digital payments, such as with payment cards and mobile payments, are the preferred choice. 
Similarly, in China people prefer embedded app payment solutions, like WeChat Pay or Alipay. In other countries, such as 
Singapore, it is the supply side – the government especially – that is pushing toward a cashless society. The supply-side arguments 
usually involve new value creation, financial inclusion by cutting out middlemen, and developing tools for the fight against 
corruption (Chakravorti et al. 2016). 
 3 
underlies the importance of cashless payment technologies in the countries’ drive toward a cashless society.  
Novel payment technologies in an economy (even if they are not truly new in a global sense) also bring 
the need to operate them well, on both the consumer and merchant sides. Smaller merchants face unique 
hurdles as they go cashless (Boon 2017b). There are economic hurdles (e.g., paying a merchant fee to accept 
e-transactions), but also the extra effort to operate any new payment technology due to the single-proprietor 
nature that is typical of their small businesses (Ahuja and Thatcher 2005). More complex payment 
technologies bring with them challenges in merchant acceptance, especially for smaller merchants, due to 
their relatively higher cost. 
This research commentary is intended to address a set of high-level questions of importance to industry 
practitioners and researchers who are interested in expanding the extent to which their country contexts can 
be studied, beyond the typical examples that are most often seen in existing industry and academic reports 
and articles:  
• (RQ1) Can cashless payment solution implementations be classified using a framework that enables 
the identification of the primary descriptors of the setting and technologies for study in a country 
context? 
• (RQ2) Can a framework be constructed that distinguishes between national and local 
infrastructures, based on commonly-accepted constructs and readily-available measures from 
leading government, business and university sources? Can such classification be done with 
authoritative measures?   
• (RQ3) Is a 3-D framework useful that identifies key dimensions related to: the level of development 
of a country’s infrastructure; the digitalization of the local implementation setting where a cashless 
payment solution occurs; and the degree of technological novelty associated with the payment 
solution at the time of its implementation in a country? 
This commentary offers the following research contributions. (1) We offer new knowledge about 
payment technology solution implementations in different developing and developed nation settings. (2) A 
framework proposing the use of three new dimensions is presented. It uses a perspective to support 
assessing cashless and other kinds of payment technology implementation settings. It does so in terms of 
local implementation environment digitalization, payment technology solution novelty, and the national 
infrastructure status of a country, based on measures from the World Economic Forum (WEF).   
The remainder of this article is laid out as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed 3-D framework for 
classifying cashless payment solution implementations at the country level.5 Sections 3 and 4 then offer 
 
5 It is not our purpose to identify representative mini-cases as a basis for classifying the countries that are discussed in this article. 
The available data from other published works in the industry and consulting literatures are not sufficient to permit a researcher to 
do that with a common basis of information for all of the different countries. We also do not delve deeply into the variety of 
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mini-case analyses for four developing country and four developed country cashless payment 
implementations. Section 5 interprets the findings about the mini-case implementation illustrations so the 
reader will understand the varied nature of the factors that were instrumental in influencing how successful 
they came to be. The mini-cases are not intended to be viewed as respresentative of all aspects of the 
individual countries’ experiences and levels of success with cashless payments over the years though. 
Section 6 summarizes and concludes with some limitations. ……………………………………………  
 
2. CLASSIFYING COUNTRY-LEVEL CASHLESS PAYMENT IMPLEMENTATIONS  
We next introduce a three-dimensional (3-D) framework for the classification of the implementations 
of cashless payments at retail point-of-sale (PoS) locations for different countries around the world at 
different points in time over the years.6 The first dimension, payment solution implementation environment 
digitalization, characterizes the extent to which the local business environment is able to effectively support 
innovative payment systems implementation. Local readiness is likely to be a function of the physical 
setting, its experience with payment technologies, the digitalization of the implementing vendor, and the 
merchants and consumers that will use it, as well as the training and educational levels of staff that will 
need to deal with novel technology implementations. The second dimension, payment technology solution 
novelty, identifies the nature of the payment system solution that is to be supported, based on whether it 
involves complex and high-performance payment services, which are new and different for the country or 
the locality in which the implementation is being done. The third dimension is national infrastructure 
development status, which is an indicator for the readiness of a country as a whole (not its local readiness 
or digitalization, which may be different) to successfully support innovative payment capabilities, based on 
its development level. These constructs provide a way of looking at payment technology innovation 
deployment settings by grouping the opportunities into facets of a 3-D classification cube, whose 
dimensions we will discuss and justify in greater detail.7 (See Appendix Table A1 for a summary of the 
 
payment technologies that have been used at different times in the different countries, since there is quite a bit of material from 
industry vendors, consulting firms and Computer Science researchers on this aspect of payment solutions.  
6 We do not wish to put forward a typology of PoS payments, since the main thrust of this thought leadership article is not about 
payment technologies and their variations over time. Instead, we mostly focus on the locations where digital payments, especially 
via cards but also online, can be made for mall store, restaurant, food court, and other public-setting purchases.  
7 An anonymous reviewer noted that our framework’s dimensions do not emphasize existing national payment infrastructure, which 
is built upon the technology ecosystem in which its major stakeholders are involved. According to WePay (2020), in addition to 
customers and merchants, the payment ecosystem is comprised of acquiring banks that work most closely with the merchants, 
payment service providers (PSPs), payment facilitators, and payment aggregators – as well as fintech start-ups and other technology 
firms. Our framework for classification is not built based on an operationalization that includes them though. Instead, it assesses 
other aspects of payment solution settings (local digitalization, solution novelty, and the deveopment of the broader national 
infrastructure). For an alternative perspective to ours, the interested should see Janis and Shah (2016) for their discussion of supply-
side and demand-side drivers, policies and regulation issues that prompt the development of inclusive payment systems in 
developing countries, as well as the high costs associated with the move to new digital infrastructure for cashless oayments (Massi 
et al. 2019). 
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definitions of the terms.) 
 
2.1. Implementation Environment Digitalization  
Implementation environment digitalization is the nature of the business and technology deployment 
setting in which cashless payment purchase transactions will take place. This dimension is intended to 
represent the readiness of a cashless payment solution’s implementation environment. So distinguishing 
between relatively less and more digitalized environments is a useful operationalization for whether 
payment technology solutions will be easier or more difficult to implement based on how well the 
environment will be able to support it. The degree of digitalization of the local implementation environment 
is typically affected by the physical and technical circumstances which, in turn, arise based on the nature 
of the business, the training of an organization’s staff for payment transactions, and the year – or era – when 
the implementation occurred (including the 1990s, 2000s, 2010s and the upcoming 2020s decade).  
Our reading of the literature suggested that there is no single measure or construct that functions in the 
exact way that our implementation environment digitalization construct is intended to. For example, one 
thread in the literature offers a theory of organizational readiness that emphasizes the effects of various 
underlying internal factors, such as the implementation climate and the perceptions of staff regarding the 
importance and feasibility of an implementation’s likely success (Klein and Sorra 1996). This is consistent 
with the changes that cashless payment solutions require the firms to deal with that implement them. 
Another thread is related to environmental readiness for evidence-based practice in healthcare 
organizations, but this still essentially applies to organizational readiness (Smith and Donze 2010). A 
greater contrast is offered by research that has proposed the construct of operational readiness. It: 
“ensures that the right people are in the right place at the right time, working with the right hardware according 
to the right procedures and management controls, and are functioning in a favourable physical and psychological 
environment.” (Levovnik and Gerbec 2018, p. 122) 
2.2. Payment Technology Solution Novelty 
Our payment technology solution novelty construct is defined in terms of its relative newness and 
complexity in a setting – typically a higher-technology solution (Watkins et al. 2017) versus a lower-
technology solution (GoCardless.com 2020) that drives payment services at the PoS, and has not been used 
before.8 We further recognize that solution novelty is time-specific and country-specific. Some countries 
are more advanced, while other are less advanced in technology deployment terms. Higher-tech applications 
such as contactless cards tend to support faster transactions, are more secure, and require less interface 
sophistication between the payment device and the PoS system, but they have appeared in different years 
 
8 An anonymous reviewer suggested that it makes sense to include technological compatibility as well (Kazan and Damsgaard 
2016). This is appropriate because compatibility with existing infrastructure, payment practices and store technologies is essential 
for success based on feasibility. 
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in various countries in the world. So the reader should recognize that novelty truly is relative. For instance, 
a PayWave contactless transaction takes about 4 to 12 seconds (RingItPlus 2019), while a magnetic stripe 
credit card swipe transaction takes about 15 seconds or more (Dwyer 2019). They have brought 
convenience to consumers in many payment settings that were not previously available, and thus have been 
driving greater usage of cashless payments. But not all merchants and consumers in different countries 
around the world have had access to these tech innovations.9  
Lower technology solution novelty, more generally, emphasizes the use of older, legacy technologies, 
such as magnetic stripe cards with EMV (Europay, Mastercard, Visa) credit card chips to produce unique 
transaction identifiers whenever a card is used. At various times in different countries in the world, they too 
have been viewed as novel solutions. Transactions, again, need to be authenticated with the cardholders’ 
signatures. In developing countries, the use of manual zip-zap card impression machines that create receipts 
have typically been used where no telephone infrastructure was available (WorldPay Editorial Team 2019). 
A payment application that offers online connectivity does not necessarily make it novel though. In online 
shopping, for example, low-tech payments are characterized by their use of postal mail or telephone 
ordering (MOTO) rules, plus the use of card verification value (CVV2) purchaser authentication, as an 
added form of transaction protection and security (Nets.eu 2015).10 But even they were viewed by the 
organizations that implemented them as being novel, when they were initially introduced in a country. 
In contrast, higher technology solution novelty typically occurs as a by-product of the application of 
the latest technologies, especially when they have not been used heretofore in a country. They include near-
field communication (NFC), quick-response (QR) machine-readable codes, one-time passwords (OTPs), 
mobile technologies, and contactless chips to store credit card information (U.S. Payments Forum 2017). 
Higher-tech solutions typically require users to download mobile apps onto their mobile phones, and they 
have been viewed as having novelty upon their introduction in many countries during the past decade. The 
apps allow consumers to update their personal information through their devices. And, they also allow them 
to scan the QR codes at checkout to wirelessly capture merchant information in many countries. The 
transactions occur with little or no physical contact resulting in purchases suitable for less-developed 
payments technology implementation environments. Also, it is possible to do such transactions with a 
mobile phone, which can share the payer’s mobile phone number without the involvement of a QR code. 
2.3. National Infrastructure Status 
 
9 In the U.K., for example, contactless payments now account for more than 40% of all transactions, and the payment limit of £14 
for transactions in 2014 was raised to £30 in 2018 (Erenhouse 2018, Gemalto 2020). This is hardly true in Myanmar and Vietnam, 
however, which have lacked the infrastructure to make such payment solutions as the U.K’s widely available. Lower-tech 
applications, in contrast, typically are less novel and slower due to their physical interfaces with PoS systems and the now-
antiquated requirement to support a payer’s physical signatures (Infineon 2016, Andriotis 2018). 
10 In the U.S., a purchaser’s home address is often used as part of the cardholder authentication verification value (CAVV) 
authentication protocol. 
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There is no standard definition of national infrastructure, but according to the World Economic Forum 
(WEF 2012), there is general agreement that it includes three types of sub-infrastructure: 
• Economic infrastructure includes projects that drive economic growth and support the society, 
including transport facilities, utilities, flood protection, waste disposal, and telecom networks. 
• Social infrastructure offers support for public services, such as public housing, hospitals, schools, 
parks and recreation to improve quality of life and biodiversity. 
• Soft infrastructure consists of public institutions that enable society to function normally, with 
government buildings, rules for law and order, and education and public health systems. 
National infrastructure is an operationally-definable basis, or pillar, in assessing global 
competitiveness, as it is a crucial enabler for innovation and efficiency. The availability of a cost-effective 
and reliable energy and communication networks do not guarantee economic growth though. Rather, they 
allow new technologies to support increased productivity and economic growth.  
We provide the WEF’s infrastructure rankings for fifteen representative countries. Among them are 
eight developing and developed countries for which we present mini-case analyses later. (See Table 2.)  










Score(b)  Rank(c) Score(b) Rank(c) Score(b)    Rank(c) Score(b) Rank(c) 
Singapore 95.4 1st 87.5 5th  Mexico 72.4 54th  55.4 74th 
Netherlands 94.3 2nd  76.3 24th  India 68.1 70th   32.1 120th 
Japan 93.2 5th 86.2 6th  Thailand 67.8 71th  60.1 62nd 
Germany 90.2 8th 70.0 36th  Indonesia 67.1 72nd  55.4 72nd  
U.K. 88.9 11th 73.0 30th  Vietnam 65.9 77th  69.0 41st 
U.S. 87.9 13th  74.3 27th  Brazil 65.5 78th  58.1 67th 
Denmark 87.1 15th  83.3 9th  Kenya 53.6 110th  35.7 116th 
Sweden 84.0 19th  87.8 4th  - - - - - 
Note. (a) The developed and developing countries in this table include all the eight countries we considered for the cashless  
payments mini-cases in later sections (shaded) – but not Brazil, Denmark, Mexico, the Netherlands, U.S., U.K. and Vietnam. (b, c) All scores and 
ranks were obtained from the WEF’s “Global Competitiveness Report 2019” (Schwab 2019). We discuss  
alternative rankings later in this article. Note that the countries are ordered based on the extent to which their Infrastructure  
was developed. Also, ICT Adoption = strength of country’s deployed ICT. The assessments are for 2018, as reported in 2019. 
The WEF ranks country-level combined transport and utility infrastructure and information and 
communication technology (ICT) adoption on a scale of 1 to 100. We used average rankings for the two 
measures as having more advanced, developed infrastructure (on the left) – in comparison to less advanced, 
developing infrastructure (on the right). To illustrate our framework, we set a ranking cut-off to define 
developing and developed countries for this research. 
In payments settings, the areas of energy and telecom are particularly relevant as payments systems 
typically require electricity and telephone networks to function. More advanced forms of payments (e.g., 
those using mobile phones) require a dependable and pervasive mobile network, with relay towers covering 
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the populated areas of a country. Payment innovations also need soft infrastructure in the form of proactive 
central bank regulations and civil and banking laws. Thus, infrastructure affects the performance of cashless 
payment solutions.  
In countries with lower infrastructure rankings (e.g., Kenya and Vietnam), the less reliable 
infrastructures for supporting payments often translate into frequent electrical blackouts and fixed-line 
telephone disruptions that prevent PoS terminals from dialing up to obtain payment authorization when 
they need to work seamlessly. Good mobile phone network infrastructure, thus, can enable a country to 
leapfrog the constraints of poor land telecom or electricity infrastructure to reap m-payments efficiency.  
The availability of m-payments also can allow a country to successfully enable millions of consumers 
to pay using their mobile phones. The lack of stable electricity, by the same token, thus will not be a critical 
constraint. The use of QR codes has done away with the need for an electrical connection at a merchant’s 
location to power a PoS terminal. The consumer now can simply scan a QR code with his or her mobile 
phone – or use only the mobile phone – and payment will be effected almost instantly without additional 
infrastructure support – a hallmark of a more-digitalized local implementation environment.11 
2.4. Proposed Framework  
The main 3-D framework dimensions are: technology implementation environment digitalization – in 
the x-axis as cube length; technology solution novelty – in the y-axis as cube height; and national 
infrastructure status for a country’s overall development – in the z-axis as cube depth. (See Fig. 1.)  In 
presenting this framework, we also wish to signal to the reader that the analysis cube offers a generalizable 
artefact for use in other technology and business implementation settings outside the payments domain.  
We will analyze why different real-world cashless payment implementations did better or worse after 
their implementation. We will do this based on publicly-available evidence for eight mini-cases – identified 
so that they map into the different 3-D cube country facets. Our research involved the following steps:  
(1) We searched business, academic and government press, research and policy articles, to identify the 
relevant intellectual foundations for the specification of the 3-D framework and so the cashless 
payments mini-cases that could be mapped to the framework’s facets. Industry professionals 
reminded us that the relative amount of available documentary evidence is slim for most cashless 
payment implementations, with some notable exceptions, as we learned in this research.12   
 
11 Other important constructs that come close to the mark of a country’s national infrastructure are fintech readiness and diffusion 
in a country. One index that has been proposed by the Asia-Pacific Economic Development Cooperation (APEC (2016) 
organization is the “Fintech E-Payment Readiness Index.” Another is from consulting firm, EY (2019), which has released the 
“Global Fintech Adoption Index.” We discuss these in Sections 3 and 4 as alternative ways to understand how to distinguish 
between the extent of developed versus developing national infrastructure in contrast to local implementation environment 
digitalization. 
12 Among our mini-cases, not all have obtained global coverage of cashless payment solution implementations: Germany’s card 
payments have been covered; and so has Kenya, for its success among developing countries with the M-PESA mobile phone-based 
money innovations; and Sweden for its impending 2023 move to the cashless society – as an exemplar for other Scandinavian 
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Fig. 1. A 3-D classification framework for country-level cashless payment solution implementation 
 
Note. We refer to the outward-facing sides of each sub-cube in the classification as country facets. This is what would be visible 
to a user if the related 2 x 2 matrix were extracted from that side of the cube. There are eight sub-cubes and facets (one per sub-
cube). In addition, Facet 6 (H-L-H) is invisible in this drawing. It is hidden from view at the lower level, right-back side of the 
classification cube. The cube is drawn in a way that permits us to present all of the countries with developing infrastructures in the 
right-front side of the cube (the Light Blue, Yellow, Light Green, and Red sub-cubes), and the countries with developed 
infrastructures in the back-left side (the Orange, hidden, Dark Blue, Gray sub-cubes). The y-axis label is written vertically, with 
“H” indicating higher technology solution novelty (newness in a setting at some point in time) for the visible facets (or sub-cubes) 
3, 4, 7 and 8. Per the request of an anonymous reviewer, we also include an “exploded version” of the classification so that the 
facets associated with the Developing National Status and Developed National Status are presented separately. (See Appendix B.) 
(2) We recognized the necessity of an operationally-defined approach to specifying the country facets 
based on the measurement of the dimensions to classify a country via its implementation setting, 
national development and payment solution novely and based on the 3-D framework’s facets, as 
described in two footnotes below.13,14 
 
nations. In contrast, Singapore’s “Hawker Go Digital  Initiative” has only gotten local press coverage. And the other countries with 
lower-profile digital payments efforts have received much sparser coverage. The written record is more difficult to uncover – and 
in some cases very limited. What led to the development of this research was a consulting project with a Singapore organization 
that permitted us to do interviews, collect relevant data and on-the-ground evidence on usage and success of cashless payments in 
hawker stalls and outdoor food courts. Other research that we have been involved with in different countries offered opportunities 
to interview executives, regulators, standards organizations and tech providers for payments – but with limitations on disclosure. 
13 A peer reviewer commented that there are no perfect quantitative equivalents for some of the dimensions. Our 3-D framework 
is a 2 x 2 x 2 composite representation, so that each of the sides of the cube has four sub-cube facets represented by their represective 
2 x 2 quadrants. There are three sides of each sub-cube that are the same among the eight sub-cubes in the 2 x 2 x 2 full cube. When 
we refer to facets, we are indicating unique triples, [(L or H) x (L or H) x (L or H)], based on the full cube’s dimensions. The triples 
include: LLL, LLH, LHL, LHH, as well as HHH, HLL, HHL and HLH. From these, we operationalized definitions for facets with 
different national, local and solutions dimensions that are used by the classification cube. 
14 Further, based on the use of the dimensions, we defined countries based on how their dimensional assessments matched the eight 
triples (e.g., HHH, HLH, etc). Our approach, as we noted earlier, was to use the WEF Global Competitiveness Report’s 
Infrastructure Development measure for the quantitative 3rd dimension. We used a ranking cut-off for Infrastructure Development 
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(3) We extracted appropriate knowledge to inform our mini-case analyses by reading the content of 
all of the sources we identified. This is appropriate when there is material available to understand 
publicly-observable events commented on in the press (e.g., weather and earthquake disasters, or 
trade and interest rate policy announcements by policy-makers).  
(4) We chose not to use a specific set of standard strategy choices for cashless payment services 
providers to frame the implementations in each of the mini-case countries, nor was our intention to 
create a typology of payment service-provider strategies. Instead, our goal was to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of the approaches that were observed to have been taken in the country 
facet mini-cases. There were not enough instances of mini-cases and sharp contrasts with respect 
to the payment services providers’ strategies to support the approaches we chose not to apply 
thouigh. Instead, we include quotations from the various interviews and publicly-available 
materials to which we had access. 
We next offer additional details on the dimensions of the proposed 3-D classification framework. They 
highlight its application and use in a more straightforward manner for business analysis and researchers 
who may wish to use it for payments, or other business technologies for which it has broader applicability. 
2.5. Additional Details Related to the Classification Framework Dimensions  
Implementation environment digitalization is assessed based on our scan of key features that 
characterize the implementation environment that suggest its relative digitalization readiness. This can 
indeed be different from the extent to which a country’s national infrastructure development status suggests 
widespread digitalization overall, such as Sweden and Japan – or something less than that, such as Thailand 
and Indonesia. Some indicative features for local implementation settings include: the presence of 
electricity and water infrastructure; whether IT has been used in the setting before; whether there are 
telecom lines and data connections available; and whether the employees at a merchant’s store have had 
sufficient training and experience with the use of cashless payment solutions, or if there is a merchants’ 
association that acts as a clearinghouse for the sharing of technology-related implementation assistance and 
payment know-how. 
Payment technology solution novelty can be assessed, as an anonymous reviewer pointed out, based on 
the relative newness of key features of the payment solution implementation in a country. Such features 
may include, but not be limited to: lower- vs. higher-speed payment transactions; lower or higher 
operational complexity; and less or more transaction and information security. Other things that add 
 
of 25th place or higher and a ranking cutoff for ICT Adoption of 40th place or higher. These two country-level measures were then 
averaged. For developing countries, our procedure was the same, though we set the Infrastructure Development and the ICT 
Adoption rankings to lower levels, both at 40th place. This enabled us to identify the countries as being generally representative of 
the various 3-D classification country facet triples. The identification of “higher” vs. “lower” assessments for the two qualitative 
dimensions was done on a more subjective basis, using the features that we described. 
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complexity to the process ought to be considered too. For example, some of them are the presence of QR 
or NFC card readers, fraud detection software, network connections that link a store to a larger company, 
intraday revenue data capture routines, etc. These kinds of things can be assessed directly by analysts who 
work in specific national and local settings with relatively older or newer technologies. We must emphasize 
that relative novelty is better understood by people, and more rarely absolute and subjective interpretations 
of true novelty in the world. This is because payment technology solution novelty is almost always what 
people involved in implementing them know in a specific place (e.g., the locale and country) at a specific 
point in time (1980-1990s, 2000s, 2010s and beyond) for payment technologies. In addition, the solutions 
may be associated with different eras, such as for contact or contactless cards only, with or without mobile 
phone applications, and with or without smartphones and tablet computers.    
National infrastructure status, in contrast, can be measured objectively and quantitatively based on a 
variety of globally-available, non-governmental organization (NGO) metrics and agency reports. In this 
research, we chose to use the Infrastructure and Adoption Pillar indictors from the World Economic 
Forum’s (WEF) “Global Competitiveness Report 2019,” which we referenced above. This and other tools 
from organizations closely tied to specific regions of the world (e.g., for Europe, the Middle East, Africa 
Asia and the Americas), or to sub-sectors (e.g., fintech firms, tech start-ups and firms in the global banking 
sub-sector), may be helpful for an analyst’s use based on the scope of the country classification that needs 
to be done. WEF’s report is useful since there are other pillars beyond infrastructure and ICT adoption.   
 We now shift to the main findings of the mini-case analyses, separated into Section 3 for developing 
countries and Section 4 for developed countries based on their WEF-assesed infrastructures. 
 
3.  DEVELOPING COUNTRY CASHLESS PAYMENT SOLUTION IMPLEMENTATIONS 
We begin our mini-case analyses to explore a variety of cashless payment solutions that have been 
implemented in countries with developing national infrastructures, involving Facets 1 to 4 in the 
framework. The countries all vary in terms of their local retail implementation environment digitalization, 
as well as the novelty and advanced technical nature of the cashless payment solutions they have sought to 
implement. We further contemplate the factors that precipitated implementation failure and success across 
four countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa: India, Thailand, Kenya, and Indonesia. We also 
discuss the Infrastructure Development and ICT Adoption pillars of the WEF’s “Global Competitiveness 
Report 2019,” as a basis for tagging the nations as developing countries due to the nature if their 
infrastructures. 
3.1.  Facet 1 (L-L-L): India – Kirana, ItzCards and the Human Element for Customer Centricity 
Facet 1 represents countries with a developing national infrastructure (low) like India. In these countries 
there are also retail environments which exhibit low levels of local digitalization and payment technology 
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novelty. One example is kirana stores in India: neighborhood convenience stores located around the corner 
from where everyone lives. We review the success of Mumbai-based DCB Bank’s ItzCash Card initiative.  
Kirana stores are typically multi-generation, family-owned businesses with close to 12 million spread 
around India (Bureau 2020) and sales representing 96% of the retail grocery business (VezaBlogAdmin 
2020). They appear to be  resistant to basic digitalization, despite the widespread move of digital technology 
into the retail spaces of developed and developing nations. Their social relevance and sustainable 
intermediation in goods and food distribution have been due to their proprietors’ knowledge of how to sell 
a locally-relevant selection of items in their neighborhood. An article in YourStory.com, the multilingual 
sub-continent e-zine, explains the great appeal of the “humble kiranas” that leads to their business 
sustainability:   
“Their accessibility, convenience and the variety of local relevant goods they stock makes these seemingly small 
stores popular. They are better tuned in to the requirements of their regular customers than several larger players. 
If you are looking for Maharastrian Chivada or lonche; Guntur chili Karnakata’s  Mankattu chili, you are more 
likely to find it in a kirana store just around the corner than on the shelfs of some fancy supermarket. Their 
intimate knowledge of the local consumer community helps them with smarter utilization of their limited store 
space, since stock only what they need to while using the wholesaler as a warehouse. In addition, they also tend 
to provide free delivery in less than an hour with a handy credit facility for regular customers.” (Mediratta 2018)  
Ninad Sheth (2020), a Nikkei Asian Review journalist, explained why the kiranas are so effective. Even 
in a market with large online commerce players that offer similar goods, food and delivery services, the 
kiranas come out on top in customer centricity due to the high degree of informedness they possess about 
their business and its customers – and because the online stores only make deliveries in five days (Li et al. 
2014a, 2014b). Another reason they are able to withstand the onslaught, especially against the larger, 
branded supermarkets, is because they can keep their real estate costs to a minimum. This is a major 
challenge for large supermarkets though. Small kiranas also manage fewer stock keeping units (SKUs) in 
a smaller space, which is critical in a country where food preferences change every 100 kilometers. Thus, 
since most of their sales transactions are in cash, kirana shops offer high potential for cash displacement, 
in spite of the low digitalization of their retail environments.15  
DCB Bank’s ItzCash Card initiative, a prepaid card launched in 2006 (ItzCash 2020), has been sold at 
20,000+ kirana shops during the past decade (The Economic Times 2011). It is a low-novelty e-payment 
card that is also low-cost for the kiranas: it uses older and simpler mag-stripe technology with a low-cost 
card reader. This allows the bank issuer to price ItzCash card services at the low end (say, at ~50 rupees or 
~70 U.S. cents). Sometimes, they are even given away for free in small denominations, so more consumers 
will be able to hold a card and top it up later. Currently, ItzCash’s prepaid card has one million users. 
However, Ravi Singh, Chief Business Officeer at ItzCash, indicated:  
 
15 Cash displacement occurs when cashless payments replace the use of cash, making it unnecessary. For additional background 
on cash displacement, see A.T. Kearney (2013).  
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“Earlier, many small merchants would discourage customers to use plastic money for payment. However, post-
demonetization, we have seen a massive behavioral change in the mind set of traditional brick and mortar retail 
merchants towards digital payment movement. Furthermore, as per RBI [Reserve Bank of India] data, we have 
only 1.5 million PoS machines in India; which together underline the existing huge opportunity in the POS 
payments segment.” (Finextra 2017) 
Because it is a domestic-use only card, however, the ItzCard cannot be used outside India. This 
circumvents issues with the international pricing structure of the related card associations, since the ItzCash 
Card is also a Visa card. It also allows for lower local interchange fees, thus leading to a lower merchant-
discount rate. This also permits the card to circumvent the need for an embedded EMV chip, which further 
lowers the cost for consumers. The real challenge, though, is the cost of PoS terminals to be deployed at so 
many kirana shops. Since they work with mag-stripe cards though, this payment solution is ill-suited for 
faster-paced convenience-store retailing, as installing NFC-capable terminals in them would be cost-
prohibitive. Terminalization, thus, is restricted to higher-volume outlets that can achieve some criterion 
scale size to be cost-effective (Finextra 2017).  
In the past, the view has been offered that this segment can be profitable for banks if they achieve cost-
effective scale size with respect to prepaid cards. Thus, it has made sense for them to explore other lower-
cost payment technologies like QR-code payments. This is now allowing more merchants in India to accept 
cashless transactions without the need for investments in more costly PoS terminals (Allirajan 2017). 
Payment systems tech sophistication for these merchants can also occur as part of a larger retailing process 
digitalization effort. For example, India’s Reliance Group was courting the kiranas the year we wrote this 
article, with a proposal to convert them to a B2B2C model in partnership with Facebook, using Reliance’s 
JioMart platform (LiveMint 2020). If successful, this will subsume the terminalization costs within a larger, 
more strategic retailing digitalization initiative.  
The kirana example shows that there is a good possibility to implement cashless payments even in L-
L-L settings, but cost of the technology and sales volumes are currently challenges to wider adoption. 
3.2. Facet 2 (H-L-L): Thailand and the Deployment of Electronic Data Capture (EDC) Machines  
Facet 2 represents countries with a national infrastructure like that of a developing country (low). We 
illustrate this facet with Thailand, where there are retail stores which exhibit considerable levels of local 
implementation environment digitalization (high), but use payment solutions with less payment technology 
novelty (low). According to the pillars of the WEF’s “Global Competitiveness Report 2019” (Schwab 
2019), Thailand’s Infrastructure Development capabilities score (67.8) ranked it 71st in the world, while on 
ICT Adoption (60.1), it ranked 62nd.  
An example of the Facet 2 scenario occurs with urban shopping malls in Bangkok, such as The Mall, 
Emporium, Siam Paragon, Paradise Park, and MBK Center (Iverson 2020), as well as the King Power Duty-
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Free stores in Suvarnabhumi Airport (2020).16 These shops serve the middle class of society and the tourist 
market. Thailand’s shopping industry generated THB 3.42 billion (Thai baht) in revenues in 2016, of which 
81% was associated with tourist spending (PATA 2018).   
Each Thai mall typically has an anchor tenant which operates a department store. Often the mall owner 
will also be the operator of the department store, taking up major space in the mall, while subletting the 
other store spaces to smaller shops. Due to high tourism spending in Thailand, a majority of retail shops 
naturally focus on the tourist market (Krungsri Research 2019). The level of digitalization in the smaller 
shops typically is limited, and cash is the main form of payment for consumer purchases. Because of the 
leisurely nature of retail shopping, there is no expressed need by consumers for faster (more novel) payment 
technology.  
In 2016, however, the Bank of Thailand promoted the use of e-cards through its Card Usage Expansion 
Project as part of the national drive to go cashless. The aim of this project was to displace cash at smaller 
retailers’ PoSs, so that the 54 million debit cards in Thailand could be used to make everyday purchases. 
Previously, the cards had mostly been used for cash withdrawals at ATMs. The government funded the 
installation of electronic data capture (EDC) machines at smaller retail shops’ PoSs, with a goal to reach 
an installed base of 550,000 EDCs by March 2018 (Chantanusornsiri 2018). The retailers enjoyed free 
rental of EDC machines, a lower merchant discount rate of 0.55% (compared to the usual 1.5-2.5%), plus 
inclusion in a “lucky winner” draw for participating merchants (Payment System Committee 2018). In spite 
of the incentives, Shoke Na Ranong, Chairman of the Thai Payment Network, noted a major limitation: 
"Debit card transactions account for only 2% of the total value of cash withdrawals from ATMs. Merchants have 
been discouraged from accepting debit cards due to the high transaction fees, while cardholders are not confident 
about using them and have concerns about the security of the magnetic stripe." (Banchongduang 2016)  
Beyond the EDC Expansion Project, the Thai government also organized various marketing initiatives 
to increase tourism spending. For example, the Thailand Shopping and Dining Paradise campaign was 
launched in 2017 by the Tourism Authority of Thailand (PATA 2018). It promoted less popular 
destinations, such as Mae Sot in Tak Province, the Kueang District in Khon Kaen Province, the 
Aranyaprathet District in Sa Kaeo Province and the Hat Yai District in Songkhla Province. Despite these 
initiatives, merchants nevertheless were slow to adopt the EDC machines (Banchongduang 2017). 
Merchants, meanwhile, were fearful that their use of cashless payments would allow the tax authorities to 
audit their revenues and earnings. The actual rollout of the EDC machines also fell behind schedule with 
only 140,000 merchants enabled out of the targeted 560,000. Merchants further complained that the 
merchant discount rate was too high. As a result, more than half of smaller retailers still use cash. This is 
 
16 The main government documents that have been guiding Thailand’s national cashless payments efforts are the “National E-
Payment Plan” (GlobalData 2019a, Suwanprateer 2016) and “Payment Systems Roadmap, 2019-2021” (Bank of Thailand 2019). 
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because they had fewer full-time employees, and instead, had to rely mostly on daily hires who were more 
familiar with cash. Due to these factors and the increasing popularity of QR codes in other countries like 
China, the Bank of Thailand introduced PromptPay, an m-payment system using a standard PoS QR code 
to encourage more use of cashless payments. This also was intended to overcome the cost challenges 
associated with EDC machines (SCB Research 2017).  
Nikhil Reddy, a payments analyst, summed up “Thailand Cards & Payments: Opportunities and Risks 
to 2022,” the report of his firm, with these things in mind:  
“[T]he share of cash in the overall payment volume is expected to decline from 85.6% in 2018 to 77.8% [by] 
2022. During the same period, the total card payment value is expected to increase from THB 1.8 trillion (USD 
56.1 bn) to THB 2.7 trillion (USD83.8 bn). … Though cash will continue to remain dominant in Thailand, these 
measures will certainly propel electronic payments, thereby further reduce the usage of cash over the next five 
years.” (GlobalData 2019b) 
We can see from this example that even with high local digitalization and strong government initiatives, if 
the merchants themselves are disadvantaged by transaction costs and concerned by factors such as tax audits 
then implementation can be negatively impacted. 
3.3. Facet 3 (L-H-L): Kenya and the Success of the M-PESA Payment Wallet  
Facet 3 represents countries with a developing national infrastructure like Kenya, where most local 
retail environments typically have insufficient digitalization of their payment solution implementation 
environments (low), making it difficult to adopt and operate advanced cashless payment systems. Based on 
the WEF Global Competitiveness 2019 pillars, Kenya’s Infrastructure Development (53.6) ranked 110th in 
the world, while its ICT Adoption (35.7) was 116th. With such weak national infrastructure in the country, 
many observers surely would have questioned the logic of implementing an advanced, mobile-phone and 
SMS-based payment system – a solution that clearly had high novelty, was technically advanced in its time, 
and challenging to operate successfully in view of the country’s unbanked population. It was under these 
circumstances that Safaricom Ltd. launched the M-PESA money remit project in 2007, and ever since, it 
has been viewed as a successful SMS-based cashless payment initiative in a developing country that was 
novel in its time (Hughes and Lonie 2007, IFC 2009). 
Topping up to add value to the M-PESA wallet required customers to visit the network of agents. These 
involved small convenience stores in wooden huts scattered across rural Kenya with only the most basic 
utilities, low retail digitalization, and a severe lack of space. M-PESA agents from that time were often 
categorized as being at the bottom-of-the-pyramid (BoP), with annual income less than USD 2,000. In the 
late 2000s, only 19% of Kenya’s population had access to formal financial services. So, while Kenyans 
were familiar with making a call using their mobile phones, they were less familiar with using it for making 
payments (Prahalad and Hammond 2002). The usual practice was to send money with someone, possibly a 
stranger travelling back to their village. This could take days though. So there was a clear and high-value 
proposition in meeting the public’s need for swifter payment exchanges. Using a mobile phone to make 
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payments was a novel, disruptive and high-tech application, given the socioeconomic background of Kenya 
in 2007, when M-PESA was launched (Christensen et al. 2015).  
This led one of the consultants on the project, Susie Lonie, to assert in an interview with a journalist: 
“From very early in the project I felt certain that we were onto something pretty big with M-PESA. However, I 
would never have predicted anything like the growth we experienced. I remember a month after the Kenyan 
launch the Safaricom CEO called us to his office and said he wanted us to triple our year one target. We thought 
he was joking but in fact we achieved this new target in the first eight months.” (Maritz 2010) 
Within four months of the official launch, customer sign-up for the service reached 268,499 users. In the 
interview, Lonie vocalized the CEO’s Safaricom’s realization that: 
“… with M-PESA … anyone with a ten dollar mobile phone [could] participate in financial services, even if they 
[had] never set foot inside a bank.”  
And, by July 2007, monthly transactions amounted to KSH 1.065 billion (Kenyan shillings) or USD 14.2 
million (Kimenyi and Ndung’u 2009). Within two years of the launch, six million customers had registered 
with the service, representing nearly half the customer base of Safaricom, M-PESA’s creator. During that 
period the P2P dollar-equivalent transfer volume for the service was over USD 1.6 billion (Mas and 
Morawczynski 2009).  
Various authors examined a number of issues: funding, sponsorship, needs and alternatives, the core 
value proposition, the service provider’s market size estimate, the complexity of M-PESA’s retail service 
agents,  and the potential impacts of government regulation.17 In particular, new entrants had to be able to 
secure funding to last through the slow uptake in the early years due to the huge investments in banking 
technology required. Also, resources needed to be allocated so the timelines for commercialization could 
be strictly followed. Significant attention was devoted to ensuring that the presence of other success factors 
would not make a difference unless the M-PESA product met a real need in the market and the less attractive 
alternatives could be clearly understood too. 
Acceptance and diffusion also was dependent on the extent to which the value proposition could be 
understood by M-PESA’s agents and their customers, as well as other institutional stakeholders (Kingiri 
and Fu 2020). Further, understanding the dominant size of the competing market incumbent’s customer 
base was critical, because M-PESA sought to cross-sell the new product to its own customers. Also, its 
physical agents were deployed on the ground to strengthen M-PESA’s acceptance and diffusion. It also 
sought to understand the watchful, proactive role of the Central Bank of Kenya, which amended the 
 
17 Some have focused on the reasons for M-PESA’s success. Hughes and Lonie (2007), for example, investigated senior 
management’s relationship with its vendor, Vodaphone, as well as M-PESA’s focus, and the fight with the obstacles of day-to-day 
project management to ensure effective delivery of a commercial service. Mas and Ng’Weno (2010) studied the operational aspects 
of M-PESA, including its branding, channel management and retail pricing, customer registration process, retail service agent 
activity monitoring, and scalable distribution structure for liquidity management. IFC (2009) reported on the business case and 
model for a mobile phone and SMS-based payment capability, and the retail aggregator model for involving M-PESA’s many 
agents. It also explored the core challenges that top management had to overcome, and the technical, cultural, operational, financial, 
marketing and strategic lessons to be learned. 
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country’s banking regulations to ensure they did not hold back the growth of new payment service and 
product innovations. Beyond its role as a centralized cashless money transfer service, the M-PESA platform 
also supported virtual savings accounts and a menu of financial services that could be accessed in 
customers’ homes, without a trip to a bank.  
M-PESA thus created a strong push for financial inclusion in Kenya (Ndung’u 2018). But, on the other 
hand, we were reminded that: 
“Agents must process a certain volume of transactions each day to make a profit, which has kept the average M-
PESA transaction as high as USD 27. This means serving low-income rural areas is just not economical for them, 
and they go where the money is. Not great news if you’re living on a few dollars a day and wish to make sub-
USD 2 transactions. … All this is not to say that mobile money hasn’t been a resounding success in Africa, an 
innovation that has brought millions of people within the reach of formal financial services. It undoubtedly has 
been. But it has evident limitations, which mean that the true potential of mobile money remains as yet unfulfilled.” 
(Jackson 2016) 
This mini-case shows that, even with a low local environment of digitalization and a low level of 
national infrastructure development, a high-novelty implementation can be successful as long as the 
consumer need is strong, there is a good value model for the agents, and a pro-active regulator. This is also 
an example where mobile payments could be used to leapfrog the legacy infrastructure in a country. 
3.4. Facet 4 (H-H-L): Indonesia’s Luxury Tourism and the Migration to EMV Chip Cards  
Facet 4 represents countries with a developing national infrastructure like Indonesia (low), yet also with 
retail establishments that have substantially digitalized technology implementation environments (high) 
that potentially can handle novel (high) cashless payment system solutions. From the WEF’s “Global 
Competitiveness Report 2019” perspective, Indonesia has an Infrastructure Development score (67.1) 
which ranked it 72nd globally, and an ICT Adoption score (55.4) that placed it 72nd also. Its transport and 
utility services infrastructure were weaker than the ICT diffusion that its digitalization capabilities built 
on.18  
There are local retail environments in Indonesia that exhibit advanced levels of digitalization and use 
highly novel payment technologies. One example is the luxury malls in downtown Jakarta – such as Pacific 
Place, Plaza Indonesia and Grand Indonesia. Indonesia’s revenue in the luxury goods market was forecast 
to be equivalent to USD 2.04 billion in 2020, according to Statista (2020). The boutiques in Jakarta’s luxury 
malls cater to the upper income segments of Indonesian society and foreign tourists. Like most other 
developing countries, Indonesia is critically dependent on tourists for foreign exchange revenue. Bali is a 
popular destination for tourists with many luxury resorts including, the Bvlgari Resort, the Four Seasons 
Resort, the St. Regis Bali Resort and the Banyan Tree Resort. As the head of Indonesia’s Central Statistics 
Agency (BPS), Suhariyanto asserted that China is the top country for arriving tourists, who made up 15% 
 
18 Overall, on WEF’s nine-pillar evaluation index, Indonesia ranks 50th, suggesting that it is in the 2nd quartile of the 195 countries 
that are members.       
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of the total in 2016. Further: 
“The [Chinese tourist] surge is not happening in Indonesia alone, but also in other countries, supported by 
[tourists’] higher earning per capita as China’s economy grows. …  We have prepared a separate, special 
breakfast called [a] Chinese breakfast in which we provide bread, porridge and dim sum.” (Susanti and Wirayani 
2016) 
Chinese tourists spend generously, averaging purchases of USD 1,000 per visit (Antara News 2018).  
The luxury malls around Jakarta offer global brand names, including Louis Vuitton, Cartier, Bvlgari 
and other companies in the LVMH Group. Due to their up-market image and global operations, these shops 
operate with high levels of digitalization in their retail processes. They also are required to support the 
payment choices preferred by their local high net-worth customers, as well as inbound tourists. The range 
of payment support, then, must include not just chip cards, but also contactless and NFC payments –  
including ApplePay, GooglePay, WeChat Pay and AliPay.19 The focus for the tourism industry is on: 
providing payment infrastructure to accommodate tourist needs; expanding the non-cash payment 
ecosystem in the tourist destinations; and the digitalization of tourist transactions to boost the overall 
volume of non-cash, digital transactions. 
Despite the high levels of digitalization in Indonesia’s tourism industry, the rest of the retail sector is 
more traditional in its operations. Over 99% of all transaction volume still takes place on a cash basis 
(CGAP 2014). Analysts estimate there are between just two to four PoS devices per 1,000 people. By 
comparison, there are 34 PoS devices per 1,000 people in the U.S. and only one per 1,000 people in India. 
The ATM and debit cards in circulation remain largely magnetic stripe-based. And, due to high level of 
money-related fraud, the government has mandated that all ATM and debit cards must migrate to EMV 
chips with a six-digit PIN by the end of 2021. As a result, achieving this mandated shift to a higher payment 
technology solution has been the focus of the country’s banking industry over the past five years.  
The high degree of  payment solution novelty in the tourism industry stands in stark contrast to the rest 
of the country. This problem is further compounded by the growth of increasingly wealthy Chinese tourists 
coming into the country who bring along their own preferences for different ways-to-pay. The Indonesian 
tourism industry also has moved to Weibo and WeChat to attract more high-spending Chinese tourists to 
Bali for their next vacation (Valentina 2016). And there has been a growing trend for luxury brands like 
Cartier and Bulgari to flock to WeChat to attract wealthy Chinese to their high-end products (Liao 2019). 
Since most Chinese prefer to pay using the China-based WeChat Pay, the industry has upgraded its payment 
capabilities to allow the use of WeChat Pay at many tourism destinations. Pablo Mauron, a partner at the 
global Digital Luxury Group offered a related opinion about Indonesia, showing the broad opportunity it 
 
19 The “2025 Indonesian Payment System Blueprint” (Bank Indonesia 2019) laid out the country’s game plan to move toward 
greater financial inclusion. It also discusses Indonesia’s cashless economy target initiatives to reduce fraud, by moving away from 
mag-stripe to EMV chip cards, and pursuing digitalization in nine leading tourism destinations. 
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has to pursue cashless payments:  
“I think WeChat is finally becoming what it’s supposed to be for luxury brands, which is not just a social media 
app. One [function] could be for customers to buy the product. Another could be for brands to build a loyalty 
program. Customers can pre-order a product or set up an appointment with the [offline] store.” (Liao 2019) 
Related to this, in early 2020 the Central Bank of Indonesia officially granted WeChatPay a permit to 
operate in the country (Jakarta Post 2020). Indonesia clearly is pursuing an outside-in strategy, that seeks 
to leverage cashless payments inside the country to make it a more attractive destination for others to visit 
and spread their wealth far and wide across the nation’s economy. 
This example shows that, as might be expected, high-novelty solutions work well in highly digitalized 
environments even in countries with low national infrastructures. However, while technology novelty may  
continue to grow in the main settings, it may not have effects that project across the entire country. 
3.5. Related Observations 
Across the “developing national infrastructure” mini-cases, common issues related to needs, choices, 
alternatives, mandates and scale size pertain to the overall desire that industry participants and governments 
have toward cashless payment systems implementation. For example, with the neighborhood kirana stores 
in India, the owners have clear-cut needs to be able to handle customer checkouts faster, but only so far as 
they are cost-effective in their low-digitalization retail store environments. The result is that the choices 
they have for the payment solutions that are offered are relatively limited, due to their lack of scale size. In 
contrast, Indonesia has been operating with a desire to make purchase transactions more attractive and 
digitalized to suit the expectations of the shopping experiences of luxury goods shoppers, while mandating 
the shift to cashless payments due to the high occurrence of cash fraud. 
Kenya’s M-PESA implementation, in contrast, has been a run-away success, And yet it too illustrates 
the common issues that we noted for the countries’ initiatives.  In Kenya, the needs of its many BoP 
consumers were clearly framed, and the lack of national coverage with branch banking and ATM services 
infrastructure were lacking. Due to the costs associated with M-PESA’s retail agent service network, as 
well as the agents’ critical need to achieve a modest return, the country still experienced severe limits to 
growth in its m-payments transaction base. And yet, for other reasons – adopting a truly-workable, mobile 
phone-based alternative, while avoiding government payment-related mandates, building a harmonious 
working relationship between the solution vendor and the service provider, and carefully architecting the 
distribution structure scale size – contributed to its eventual success.  
Thailand did not fare quite as well due to scale and usage challenges, specifically the difficulty to 
effectively deploy the technology related to supporting the goals of its Card Usage and Electronic Data 
Capture Expansion Projects, as a way of meeting the goals proposed by the government’s “National e-
Payment Plan” and “Payment Systems Roadmap, 2019-2021.”  
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4. DEVELOPED COUNTRY CASHLESS PAYMENT SOLUTION IMPLEMENTATIONS 
We next discuss four additional mini-cases that illustrate problems that cashless payment solutions face, 
in spite of there being a “developed national infrastructure” in the country where they are locally 
implemented. The countries all vary in terms of their local retail implementation environments’ 
digitalization, and the technological novelty of their cashless payment solutions. We identify drivers of 
failure and success for solution implementations that occurred in Japan, Germany, Singapore and Sweden. 
And we continue to consider the WEF’s Global Competition Report 2019’s Infrastructure Development 
and ICT Adoption Pillars, and to assert that our cashless payment mini-cases represent novel technical 
innovations in developed countries when they were implemented. 
4.1. Facet 5 (L-L-H): Japan’s Lagged Implementation of EMV Chip Cards 
Facet 5 represents countries with a well-developed national infrastructure (high), like all the mini-cases 
in this section. Japan has weaker implementation environment digitalization (low) in many local settings 
though. We will explore a typical retail setting, in restaurants, retail shops, small eateries and convenience 
stores, which requires fast purchase chechouts, but often they still are using slower and relatively less 
advanced payment technology solutions – in comparison to some of the country’s major downtown areas 
in larger cities, and to the world overall. Thus, the level of technology solution novelty that we investigate 
is not nearly as advanced as what you may observe in Japan with respect to factory robotics, mobile phones, 
and applications of natural language processing (NLP).  
As evaluated by the “Global Competitiveness Report 2019” (Schwab 2019), Japan is ranked 93.2 on 
Infrastructure (5th) and 86.2 in ICT Adoption (6th).20 Thus, Japan is an exemplar of a country with a highly-
developed infrastructure, and yet it has been slow to adopt advanced payment technology solutions which 
can enable speedy payments, including NFC-based and contactless payments. Surprisingly, Japan’s 
mandate to implement EMV chip cards lagged behind other countries, too. The primary reason was the 
unique and highly complex domestic market, language issues, and challenges to comply with local chip 
standards (Kadoyama 2017).  
But the increasing level of credit card fraud related to merchants’ unprotected PoS payment processes, 
and the Tokyo 2020 Olympiad (postponed to 2021 due to COVID-19) created some urgency for the 
government to move more quickly. The website of the central bank, the Bank of Japan, elaborated on its 
“Action Plan 2017 for the Consolidation of Security Measures for Credit Card Transactions”: 
"[In] recent years, Japan has been facing an increase in the number of incidents involving leaks of personal credit 
card information by unauthorized access targeting the computers of credit-card merchants with insufficient 
security measures. These leaks also trigger an increase in the number of victims involved in unauthorized use of 
credit cards, including transactions by forged credit cards and spoofing online transactions. … Looking overseas, 
the United States, like Japan, had lagged behind in terms of introducing IC (EMV) card payment systems and 
 
20 An alternative approach, the Global Fintech Readiness Index (EY 2019), reported that Japan’s rate of consumer fintech adoption 
was 34%, the lowest across 27 markets. The average adoption among the 27 markets was 64%.   
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saw a concentration of damage due to unauthorized use of credit cards from around the world, but the country 
has been dramatically advancing the introduction of IC card payment systems. As this trend in the introduction 
of IC card payment system continues, Japan is facing the growing risk of becoming a credit card security hole 
among global society and a country prone to the concentration of international crime. In May 2016, an incident 
of unauthorized cash withdrawal transactions occurred in Japan using forged cards originally issued by a bank 
in South Africa. In just three hours or so, over 1.8 billion yen in total was simultaneously withdrawn from ATMs 
in convenience stores nationwide, causing huge damage. … To prevent further damage due to unauthorized 
credit-card transactions, in March 2015, the JCA and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
proactively established the Credit Transaction Security Council, aiming to develop an international-level security 
environment for credit-card transactions with an eye on 2020." (METI, 2017) 
The image of Japan from the outside is of a uniformly high-tech country. But in reality the use of lower-
tech approaches is more common than many think. A professional comic book writer has written: 
“As a British person living in Japan, I regularly get comments from people back home like: “Wow, Japan! What 
a high-tech world you must live in. … Well, no. In fact, I will hazard a claim: The U.K. is a considerably more 
high-tech country than Japan. And please, before anyone mistakes this for just another attack on Japan … Walk 
into almost any post office, bank or estate agent and the non-Japanese visitor may be taken aback by the extensive 
use of paper-based and labor-intensive systems, and the relatively low level of computer usage.” (Wilson 2015) 
While the government has plans to speed up irrevocable funds movement via more contemporary 
approaches, cashless payments currently still make up only 20% of all transactions – lower than world-
leader Sweden, and far lower than many other western as well as Asian countries (Höglind 2019). Why? 
First, the Japanese market is unique and complex, requiring much coordination and interactions among 
many stakeholders for EMV certification and testing. These stakeholders (again surprisingly) do not have 
the necessary technical expertise. Second, compliance with the local standard, FeliCa 
(felicanetworks.co.jp), is a complicated process. Third, EMV specifications are in English, which is not 
understood by many in Japan.  
While contactless payments are ubiquitous within Japan’s public transport industry, the merchants 
accepting the card for payment tend to be mostly those around train stations and only for smaller amounts. 
The larger retailers, on the other hand, resist new payment technologies (Milne 2015), thus making Japan 
also known as a country where “cash is king” (Reuters 2019). So, even with a highly-developed national 
infrastructure there can be low-novelty technical solutions in use and low local-digitalization environments 
caused by environment complexity alongside consumer, merchant and government reluctance to change. 
4.2. Facet 6 (H-L-H): Germany’s EK-Carte and the Slow Move toward Cashless Payments  
Facet 6 represents countries with a developed national infrastructure (high) that attempt to implement 
a less-novel payment solution (low) in a highly-digitalized implementation environment (high). Germany 
is one such country among many. According to the “Global Competitiveness Report 2019” (Schwab 2019), 
Germany had a strong Infrastructure score (90.2), ranking it 8th in the world, while for ICT Adoption (70.0), 
it ranked 36th. Despite its highly-developed infrastructure, the German people are known to be heavy cash 
users. In 2017, for example, 74% of purchases were carried out with cash (Handelsblatt 2019). When they 
do not make cash transactions, the closest alternative is the ubiquitous “girocard,” a national network for 
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PIN-based debit cards. It received six billion transactions in 2017, and is often used in the retail sector (Mai 
2018). The overall use of card transactions among the various payment methods in Germany in 2018 was 
only 22.8% with cash payments at an astonishingly very high 76.1%. (See Fig. 2.)  
The girocard – known as the EC-Karte in Germany – had a 14.3% overall payments share, and achieved 
15.9% of purchases in the clothing and sporting goods sector in Germany in 2017 (Korella 2017). This 
occurred despite the sector’s previously having implemented relatively high levels of retail digitalization. 
The EC-Karte is a PIN-based bank debit card, which allows consumers to withdraw cash from ATMs and 
make purchases at retail establishments across many medium to large retailers, so long as they have a valid 
PIN. It is known for the payment problems that it creates for some consumers. 
A foreign blogger based in Berlin, for example, incensed by the need to resort to using cash, wrote: 
Fig. 2. Transactions in the German retail sector in 2018, by payment method (%)   
 
Source. Data and image are in the public domain via Deutsche Bundesbank (2019), and EHI Retail Institute (2019) in German. 
Percentages are based on 20 billion total payment transactions. 
“On Thursday I will need to buy some furniture in IKEA and, as confirmed on their website, again credit 
cards are not allowed. So, because it takes some time to get all the information together to open a German bank 
account, again I will be off to the cash machine and drawing out a bunch of notes. … Most of the rest of Europe 
has fixed this, and long ago. In U.K., Denmark or Sweden I can pay more or less anywhere with a U.K. Visa or 
Mastercard. Even in Belgium it works most of the time, and even SNCB [National Railway Company of Belgium] 
now accepts Visa. But for IKEA, that very symbol of globalisation, to not accept global payment cards? That’s 
absurd.” (JonWorth Euroblog 2013) 
More novel and faster forms of payments, such as contactless and m-payments, have not become popular, 
while only 5-7% of Germans used smartphones to pay in 2018 (Mai 2018). So, it is nothing like Singapore, 
South Korea, China, Denmark and Sweden. 
In fact, Germany is an extreme case among our mini-cases related to cashless implementation 
(Deutsche Bank 2020). Despite its developed infrastructure, the Germans seem to have a strong disdain 
toward using plastic (DW.com 2018), and instead, have continued to register strong cash use across all 
categories of payments. It is particularly vexing that for the country’s retail sector, where many other 
developed countries with highly-digitalized retail store implementation environments have consumers who 
 23 
exhibit high levels of cashless payments use. This often occurs despite the implementation of more novel 
NFC and contactless payment solutions – and especially so, since the cost of these technologies has fallen 
considerably.21 The reasons for the slower diffusion of cashless payments in Germany’s case are worth 
considering: (1) consumers there, according to a Bundesbank Executive Board member, perceive cash 
transactions … as a secure and simple way to pay; and (2) Visa CEO, Alfred Kelly, has also asserted that 
“the Germans are very sensitive about their data, perhaps even more than in other parts of the world,” and 
there are data and security concerns that come with shifting to cashless payments (Handelsblatt 2019). This 
seems likely to continue given the country’s cultural traits of debt aversion, household frugality and saving 
money. It is interesting that the “German word for ‘debt,’ after all – schuld – also means ‘guilt’ ” (DW.com 
2018). So no wonder the author characterizes the situation as “No cards please, we’re German!”22 
This example shows that despite a highly developed infrastructure and highly technical local 
environments, solution novelty can remain low due to consumer’s contentment with cash and concerns with 
cashless solutions such as with data privacy.  
4.3.  Facet 7 (L-H-H): The Singapore Government’s “Hawker Go Digital Initiative” at Food Courts 
Facet 7 represents countries with well-developed national infrastructure (high) like Singapore, but low 
implementation environment digitalization in some locales outside the city center and the malls. As 
evaluated by the WEF’s “Global Competitiveness Report 2019” (Schwab 2019), Singapore ranked 1st in 
Infrastructure score (95.4) and 5th in ICT Adoption (87.5), reflecting its strong role as a competitive, top 
economy.23 Singapore also has many high-tech, novel cashless payment systems in use across the country.  
Open-air food courts, also known as hawker centres in Singapore and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, 
house 10-70 stalls that sell a wide variety of affordably-priced foods, with prices averaging SGD 4 per meal 
(about USD 3) (Tung 2016). Hawker centres were highlighted in a consulting report commissioned by the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), its central bank, entitled “Singapore Payments Roadmap: 
Enabling the Future of Payments 2020 and Beyond” (KPMG 2016). The report pointed out that hawker 
centres topped the list of places where cash payments predominate, in many instances exceeding 90% of 
the total value of transactions, thus offering an opportunity for cash displacement. The Singapore 
government initiated the “Hawker Go Digital Initiative” (The New Paper 2020), emphasizing the 
 
21 An anonymous reviewer suggested that NFC cards were launched by the German savings banks (Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe 
members) in 2018, but the terminals to accept them were not enabled then. 
22 An inappropriate conclusion for the German context is to argue that preferences for cash are somehow cultural predispositions 
for holding cash. The populations of numerous countries share this characteristics, but it has been mostly firms in the financial 
service sector whose practices have shaped their customers approach over the years, based on the services that have been offered. 
23 In another study, the 2018 Asian Digital Transformation Index (ADTI), by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Singapore ranked 
1st in Digital Infrastructure (82.5), with Hong Kong (63.6), Japan (58.9), South Korea (54.3) and Taiwan (47.6) rounding out the 
top 5 in Asia, and India (36.1), China (35.7), and Thailand (26.4) scoring lower in 7th, 8th and 9th places, respectively (EDB 2019). 
We decided not to use this index because there is no comparable Economist Intelligence Unit study for Europe and North America. 
The European Commission (2019) releases the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) with somewhat different measures, 
which makes direct comparisons difficult as well. 
 24 
digitalization of the payment process for hawkers, food courts and fast food outlets, extending its high-tech 
approach to less digitalized implementation environments. The program included subsidized PoS terminals 
for hawker centre merchants to support contemporary payment solutions, including contactless cards and 
m-payment devices. Such devices were intended to meet the needs of hawkers for speedy payments, while 
creating next-level convenience for consumers and reducing the use of cash in local implementation 
environments like outdoor food courts. They had relatively low infrastructure digitalization and weak ICT 
penetration compared to elsewhere in Singapore.  
Hawker centre food stalls are characterized by congested working spaces that are not conducive to the 
use of cashless payments solutions, including debit and credit cards. Due to their small size and low-value 
transactions, cash has been the main form of consumer payment. Recent government initiatives that  placed 
novel cashless payment technologies at hawker stalls are akin to the “last mile in the cashless journey” for 
developed countries though. They may exist as a small segment of an otherwise developed economy that 
enjoys developed national infrastructure, with most other retail environments already accepting cashless 
payments (e.g., stores, theaters, restaurants, etc.). 
About 500 hawkers became involved in the first 18 months (Wong and Heng 2019), but the Cashless 
Payments Initiative, according to media reports, was suggested to have had a less-than-successful rate of 
implementation. For example, a 57-year old hawker was quoted as having said: 
“No one used the cashless system for most days in the first one to two years, at most there were one to three 
customers. I also had to pay a monthly fee of SGD 28 for the device, and the payment options were limited.” (The 
New Paper 2020) 
And most hawker stall operators continued to rely on cash as the main form of payment, with some 
expressing concerns about the barriers to cashless payments implementation success (Ha and Lin 2018). 
Consumers did not exhibit a strongly positive response – even with the “free drink” incentives offered. 
Our research points to several factors in Singapore’s developed infrastructure that posed unique 
challenges to success with cashless payments in outdoor food courts. First, the presence in the nation of a 
mature and well-developed financial infrastructure meant that the likelihood of counterfeit currency was 
low (MAS 2020). So there was no push to use cashless payments to reduce fraud from paper currency, 
which is a much more common problem in developing countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Kenya and 
China. Second, ATMs and cashback services are conveniently available across Singapore (MAS 2019), 
such as at POSB (2020) kiosks and store locations. The country also has one of the lowest crime rates in 
the world, which makes withdrawing and carrying cash much safer for consumers (Low 2018). 
Third, Singaporean consumers are known to have a habit of using cash at hawker centres (Chia 2017) 
– like many adults and senior citizens in other Asian nations, who make their purchases in cash. But this is 
common in many countries around the world, and is not a unique cultural difference. By participating in 
the observation of hawker centre consumer purchases, we found that many instinctively reached into their 
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pockets for cash – despite display signs that cashless payment options were available. Fourth, our research 
in Singapore also has shown how another segment of retail outlets, which began requiring faster cashless 
payments in the past three or four years, can succeed. It is the fast food chain, McDonald’s. Although 
consumers previously used credit and debit cards at the cashier’s window, recently most order their food 
via a self-service kiosk, in lieu of standing in a slow-moving queue with an over-worked counter staffer. 
So, practically speaking, the only effective means of payment is cashless now (Pucci 2019). Thus, cash 
displacement appears to be more successful when customers have no real choice. The requirement for 
merchants is hefty investments in self-service technology (similar to what is often observed in airport food 
courts now), and the end-to-end ordering process – including payment – is digitalized. The approach of 
mandating a no-choice-but-cashless policy for customers is critical, but it may only be possible with a 
global brand that relies on ample financial strength and kiosk-use incentives. In this context, Singapore’s 
prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, encouraged additional effort:  
"From the point of view of users, and if you compare with other countries, there is a lot more we have to learn. 
We have not gone as far as we need in order to do cashless payments in hawker centres, in shops, between 
people.” (Boon 2017a) 
Again, we see that even with strong government initiatives, highly technical infrastructure and novel 
solutions available, it is the consumer and merchant habits and concerns that drive the success of the 
cashless payments solutions. 
4.4.  Facet 8 (H-H-H): Sweden and Its Swish Cashless Payment System 
Facet 8 represents countries with a developed national infrastructure (high), local retail implementation 
environments with high levels of digitalization (high), and relatively novel payment technology deployment 
(high). According to WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report 2019 (Schwab 2019), Sweden’s national 
Infrastructure Development score (84.0) put it in 19th place globally, and its ICT Adoption ranking is even 
stronger (87.8) at 4th place overall. It is a country with a highly-developed infrastructure closest among 
nations to achieving a totally-cashless society – targeted for March 2023. Currently, cash transactions 
represent only 1% of the country’s GDP, making it the world leader (European Payments Council 2019). 
A driving force behind this was the 2012 rollout of Swish (swish.nu), to support account-to-account 
(P2P) payments between private users. Its conceptualization is described in the firm’s online materials: 
“Once upon a time, though not so long ago, there was a country high up in Northern Europe where people 
tried to pay for their share of the joint dinner. It was tedious for the poor citizens who really wanted to live a little 
more spontaneously and southern-like – where someone could take the whole bill without making a scene having 
to count coins or running to the nearest ATM. That was the birth of an idea that came to be a natural part of more 
than seven million Swedes' everyday lives; Swish.” (Swish 2020) 
Related to this, a London-based blogger, wondering why Swish wasn’t available in the U.K. where he lived 
in 2017, wrote about his interaction with a Swede, who told him:  
“‘Just Swish it to me. It is easier and safer than having cash.’ That’s what a Swedish friend told me after 
having dinner when I recently visited Stockholm. When I told him that I did not know what Swish was, he was 
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shocked. ‘Everyone uses Swish nowadays. No one uses cash anymore. Swish is a free and instant mobile app 
payment. You should check it out.’” (Etienne 2017) 
In fact, more than two-thirds of Swedish residents use Swish (Fawthrop 2019), with nearly 7.5 million 
people sending and receiving money, as of the 3rd quarter of 2020 (Swish 2020). On the 25th of September, 
Swish processed over three million transactions (over one million busienss transactions and two million 
P2P transactions). Swish is jointly-owned and operated by seven of Sweden’s largest banks: Danske Bank, 
Handelsbanken, Länsforsäkringar, Nordea, SEB, Swedbank and Sparbankerna. The country’s Mobile  
Payments Working Group has been led by the Swedish Bankers Association, and its participation in the 
2012 founding of Swish was crucial. While P2P payments grew in popularity due to the rise in demand for 
them, the app’s functionality has been expanding, enabling it to penetrate into the retail and service sectors. 
Retail consumers appreciated the “tap-and-pay” experience using a bluetooth module tethered to Swish. 
This module communicated in a contactless manner with a bluetooth box that is connected to a merchant’s 
PoS terminal. Scanning a product’s QR code at a merchant was also available for Swish. Implementation 
of novel payments technologies such as these was assisted by the Nordic Council of Shopping Centres 
(NCSC 2016), which collaborated with United Minds and the Institute of Management of Innovation and 
Technology to put on a series of implementation readiness workshops held in 2015 and 2016 to support the 
digitalization of retail spaces. 
While Swish was moving from P2P payments into the retail space, retailers had already begun accepting 
contactless cards for payment for some time (Staykova and Damsgaard 2015a, 2015b). In 2019, Swish 
began moving to in-store payments with bluetooth checkout technology (Finextra 2019). Pär Ekroth, a 
marketing manager at Swish in Stockholm, noted that:  
"Seven million Swedes walk around with the Swish app in their pocket, and it’s clear that the demand for easier 
in-store payments is increasing. As such, we are pleased to offer mobile payments functionality to our customers.” 
(Finextra 2019) 
Swish also provides extra functionality that supports store sales, including loyalty program 
management and real-time geo-tagging of offers, as well as real-time processing of funds. While other 
payment systems like credit and debit cards have required a few days to credit a merchant with sale, Swish 
transactions disrupted and transformed the usual cycle of retail payments, enabling the credit to occur 
almost immediately. This removed one of the major challenges of going cashless – cashflow  problems 
(Insights Nordea 2019).  
Though Swish m-payments were likely to succeed – based on the fresh approach they took with 
payment services functionality, there were other strategic initiatives that led to success on the ground and 
how far Sweden has advanced in its journey toward a cashless society. One is the framework regarding 
contract law. In Sweden, contract documents take precedence over banking and payment law documents. 
So, a sign on a shop window indicating that it does not accept cash implies that there is a contract between 
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that store and a customer that the store will not accept cash. Several other drivers include the early 
implementation of payment cards in the 1950s in Sweden, the extent of the nation’s Internet infrastructure 
in the 1990s, and the central bank, Sverige Riksbank’s decision to outsource the printing and distribution 
of cash, which made cash more expensive to use (Arvidsson et al. 2017). More shops started to display 
signs that said they do not accept cash. There is an expectation that mobile and Internet payments will pick 
up in retail and overtake card payments soon (Hedman 2018). 
This example shows that with a developed national infrastructure, local retail environments with high 
levels of digitalization can be successful with relatively novel payment technology deployment that 
consumers find useful and convenient. 
4.5.  Related Observations 
The commonalities that we discussed earlier also seem to apply to the “developed national 
infrastructure status” mini-cases as well, though the national settings and payment solution contexts are 
different. This suggests the usefulness of the 3-D framework for analyzing the range of cashless payment 
initiatives that we examined and highlighting the factors that drive their success and failure. On the other 
hand, we did not acquire evidence to suggest that different national cultures created a basis for identifying 
differences in the novelty or success of cashless payment solutions – with the exception of Germany to 
some extent.  
Knowledgeable observers of the issues faced over the years with respect to payment systems recognize 
that, in spite of a country’s e-commerce and fintech cultures of innovation, there are still vexing problems 
that slow the rollout of more effective, higher-tech solutions as long as other cost-effective solutions are 
still available. The lagging implementation of EMV chip cards and readers is a case in point in Japan. 
Singapore’s experience, in contrast, touches on the issue of consumer and merchant needs, as well as the 
choices and alternatives that have been available to the key stakeholders of payment systems solutions 
(including the commercial banks). Germany’s slow cashless payments uptake situation is interesting, in 
spite of its strong national infrastructure and ICT penetration, so the extent of the digitalization of its 
payment processes is less than one may expect. Although it has a number of choices and alternatives, and 
a large enough population to ensure high scale size (similar to Swish in Sweden), it turns out that the 
German people, who are very sensitive about their personal data, have not adopted new payment 
innovations – while the government has not mandated change in this domain.24   
Singapore offers a number of contrasts to some of the other countries, especially with respect to the 
typical “succeed to the greatest extent possible in the national interest” attitude the government typically 
 
24 There is a great contrast with the importance that Germany has placed on a number of sub-initiatives of the overall national effort 
to achieve highly-digitalized Industry 4.0 capabilities in support of manufacturing, services, distribution and logistics, process and 
technology standards, and other activities that are critical for its creation of high GDP (European Commission 2017) .   
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projects in its technology initiatives.25 In the “Hawker Go Digital Initiative” food court context, however, 
having a highly-developed national infrastructure was not a sufficient condition to ensure success in light 
of the much less-digitalized, meal-service outdoor hawker centres (Deogawanka 2019). Although there 
clearly are numerous advantages and future gains to be reaped, the first several years of the initiative did 
not produce very positive results. Instead, they demonstrated the range of barriers to cashless payment 
implementation, including consumer and vendor willingness to work beyond their habits with cash, and to 
understand that the incentives that were put into place for consumer use were insufficient to encourage 
change. During the same timeframe, McDonald’s, a leading branded restaurant there, rolled out kiosk-based 
ordering and cashless payment at its restaurants. The program ended up being a resounding success, 
reducing queues and waiting times, while steering customers more effectively to forgo the use of cash.       
The Swedish mini-case involving Swish is perhaps the most straightforward success story of the group 
of initiatives that we analyzed. The solution it offered in the early 2010s was compelling in terms of what 
people needed for P2P payments, simple in terms of implementation since they already had mobile phones, 
and high early in scale size on its road to successful national penetration. Paving its way was the long-
standing experience that consumer banking, its payments association and people had with highly effective, 
networked retailed banking services. So its widespread penetration in Sweden since Swish’s inception 
resulted in collateral innovation, further broadening platform envelopment (Parker et al. 2016). 
 
5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION  
We first offer a summary of the mini-case findings from Sections 3 and 4. (See Table 3 for  an overiew.) 
Then, immediately after, we offer a broader interpretation of what has been learned in this research, 
including our thoughts on strategies in the area of cashless payments. 
The analysis of the strategies undertaken by organizations in the various countries for achieving success 
with the implementation of cashless payments solutions is different than what we see with firms that 
compete directly with one another in the same or overlapping markets. In the domain of building effective 
cashless payment solutions, the emphasis is on improving the competitiveness of a country’s overall 
infrastructure at an acceptable cost, so that the country’s technological base is strengthened in support of 
its participation in the international economy, and related to its capabilities for globalization. A policy 
analysis report from the United Nations Conference on Technology and Development (UNCTAD) explains 
this general perspective in terms of divergence in industrial performance, the speed of innovation, and the 
 
25 Examples of Singapore government and research agency funding programs include, for example: the National Cybersecurity 
R&D Programme (National Research Foundation); the International Research Centre @ Singapore Funding Initiative, and the IDM 
Programme Office, Media Development Authority (National Research Foundation); and The 100 Experiments to solve industries’ 
AI problem statements and help them build their own AI teams (AI Singapore 2020). 
 29 
capacity to reduce transaction and information costs in economic exchange:  
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Table 3. Mini-Case Findings 
FACET SECTION 3-D COUNTRY FINDINGS 
Developing National Infrastructure 
1 3.1 L-L-L India 
(a) Even though India generally scores low on all three dimensions of our 
classification framework, the country has received remarkably high ratings 
for its faster payments readiness. 
(b) Kirana stores are especially worthwhile settings in which to explore prepaid 
card novelty for faster PoS payments. 
(c) Implement of cashless payments is possible, even in L-L-L settings, but 
technology costs and sales volumes pose challenges for wider adoption. 
2 3.2 H-L-L Thailand 
(a) Thailand has focused its payments efforts on shopping in large urban 
shopping malls with developed capabilities, especially for tourism 
payments. 
(b) It also has sought to deploy e-data capture technology at smaller shops to 
encourage the use of payments cards more often.  
(c) But 50% of smaller retailers still require cash transactions. 
3 3.3 L-H-L Kenya 
(a) Kenya’s M-PESA, which involves use of mobile phones and involvement 
of many human agents to facilitate value exchanges has been surprisingly 
successful, so it has achieved global notoriety.  
(b) It supported the government’s strong push for financial inclusion of its 
population, and it has often been used in people’s homes. 
(c) Since it created service capabilities for people and communities with 
banking access, M-PESA proved to be transformative for the sector and 
country. 
4 3.4 H-H-L Indonesia 
(a) Indonesia’s focus in payments has primarily been to build infrastructure to 
serve the tourism market, a major revenue sector. 
(b) Expansion has occurred in the non-cash payment ecosystem in tourist 
destinations; and the digitalization of tourist transactions. 
(c) Payment solution novelty is very visible in the country’s tourist areas, but 
this is in stark contrast to non-tourist destinations. 
Developed National Infrastructure 
5 4.1 L-L-H Japan 
(a) Japan has exhibited lagged adoption of EMV chip cards, like the U.S., with 
problems of limited expertise and complex processes. 
(b) Compliance for cashless payments with the FeliCa card has been hard, and 
English EMV specifications have added roadblocks. 
(c) The result has been that the uptake of EMV chip cards has not been rapid, 
and more often occurred in public transit and stores nearby train stations. 
6 4.2 H-L-H Germany 
(a) In Germany, contactless and non-cash payments have lagged in growth due 
to dominance of the EC-Karte, which has less tech novelty, but is seen as 
safer and fast enough for domestic retailing. 
(b) Slower non-cash payment method diffusion has also been held up by the 
limited trust in cash and disdain for digital ID sharing among Germans. 
(c) High digitalization stores lead in consumer cashless payments. 
7 4.3 L-H-H Singapore 
(a) Singapore’s government offered subsidies for cashless payments 
implementation in locally less-digitalized hawker centres. 
(b) Contactless cards, m-payments were expected to gain acceptance, but large-
scale rollout has met with low enthusiasm. 
(c) Low crime rates and a lack of money fraud, and customers’ cash habits have 
made cashless payments less urgent, unless popular stores forced adoption. 
8 4.4 H-H-H Sweden 
(a) Sweden’s 2012 rollout of Swish struck a chord with consumers, leading to 
rapid uptake, and to successful usage for P2P payment capabilities. 
(b) The tap-and-pay experience has been delivered via a bluetooth module 
tethered to Swish, and for contactless communication with a bluetooth box 
connected to a merchant’s PoS terminal. 
(c) Simultaneous penetration of contactless cards into retail stores provided 




“Industrial countries worry greatly about competitiveness, about maintaining their competitive lead over new 
entrants, and their concerns are revealed by the steady stream of productivity and competitiveness analyses. The 
process is more difficult, and the stresses correspondingly greater, for developing countries, although a large 
body of theory suggests that with their wage cost advantages all they should do is open up to global trade and 
investment flows. The evidence shows that this is too simple a view, and that it is leading to growing divergence 
[in] industrial performance rather than convergence. The main reasons for the growing importance of 
international competitiveness are technological. The rapid pace of innovation – and the resulting promise of 
productivity increase – makes it more costly to insulate economies from international trade and investment. Since 
new technologies benefit all activities, traded and non-traded, rapid access to such technologies in the form of 
new products, equipment and knowledge becomes vital for national welfare. Insulation from global markets and 
technologies is no longer a viable option for any developing country. Then there is the shrinking of "economic 
distance" – a consequence of technological change in communications and transport – that reduces transaction 
and information costs and so forces economies together. The growing ability of firms to network far-flung 
activities, also a consequence of shrinking economic distance, allows production chains to be spread over longer 
distances, thus leading to closer integration of activities, processes or even specific functions” (UNCTAD 2003). 
Payment systems have the properties of public goods: non-excludability of use by one consumer over 
another; non-rivalrous consumption so that use by one consumer does not prevent others from accessing it; 
and they are often consumable at no cost. With their globalization, cashless payments have become more 
important and are now viewed as part of a country’s critical national infrastructure of IT networks (CPNI 
2020). The surge in online shopping during the COVID-19 pandemic has further highlighted the importance 
of cashless payments, as opposed to payments with cash. There is also increasing impetus around the world 
for sustainable, faster payments and immediate settlement – even though the typical interpretation of 
sustainability is more often related to affordable clean water, a healthy living environment, the availability 
of healthcare, and access to knowledge. Social sustainability and the inclusion goals of countries today 
include focusing on people who may be excluded from economic and social opportunities, including access 
to cashless payments.26 This suggests another aspect of the digital divide that has been the subject of so 
much attention over the years.  
And yet, even though countries are not subject to the same competitive dynamics as firms are, there 
still are useful aspects of how to think about strategy at the level of industry sectors and societies. It is at 
this level where technology investment decisions must be gauged as feasible or infeasible in terms of 
producing desired outcomes, and harmonizing with existing national and local infrastructure, and 
organizational interests (Kauffman 2020a). Thus, just as firms must consider the access they have to 
strategic resources to achieve sustainable competitive advantage in a crowded marketplace, so must 
countries consider what unique resources they have access to in order to make the deployment of new 
cashless payment solutions beneficial for those who seek to obtain the desired outcomes. Thus, the 
resource-based view of the firm (Clemons 1991, Peteraf 1993) also applies in a general way to countries, 
although the benefits of valuable, rare, difficult to imitate and non-substitutable resources need to be 
 
26 For example, this has been happening in the U.S. as Amazon builds cashless, no-staff conveniece stores. And also for the public 
policy problems in Europe associated with population migration-related payment solutions for refugees, where school lunches for 
children whose families don’t have bank account access, medical services, and disabled / elderly people must be provided. 
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understood more as enablers of implementation and payment solution success than as longer-term 
differentiators for their competitive sustainability.  
The creation of cost-appropriate, high-functionality and forward-looking cashless payment capabilities 
is akin to the purchase of a future growth option for a country and its industry sectors to be able to do things 
in the future that would not be possible in the absence of the advanced digitalization of payments (Dai et 
al. 2005, Kauffman and Li 2005). Cashless payments capabilities are advanced telecom-related services, so 
it is important to think of building such capabilities as “hook-up-or-lose-out” decisions (Clemons and 
McFarlan 1986). This is true in a country related to reduction of its transaction costs and economic growth, 
and in its external relations, so it becomes a more attractive destination for global connectivity and foreign 
direct investment. This is especially true among nations in light of the European Community’s decision to 
implement the Payment Systems Directive 2 (PSD2) in 2018 (Romānova et al. 2018). And, in today’s 
COVID-19 context, contactless and mobile payments have become critical approaches to reducing 
infections from viral contagions, by reducing the handling of unsanitary cash. 
In addition, cashless payments capabilities act as a future-oriented payment platform for nations 
(Kauffman 2020b). This way, consumers, intermediaries and producers can do better in the co-creation of 
value in their regional economy through advanced network services – which is essentially a Smart Nation 
capability (Kauffman et al. 2010, Kauffman 2020b). The development of cashless payment platforms is 
especially interesting since they create opportunities for developing collateral services on top of them to 
benefit many kinds of stakeholders.27 
Our framework yielded useful observations to help others understand the strategic, tactical and 
operational approaches that have been used to enable cashless payments success (e.g., Indonesia, India and 
Singapore), even if things did not always work out as expected there and elsewhere. Further, we presented 
evidence for network-based business and social value creation, as well as the critical importance of scale 
size. The extent to which cashless payment intermediaries are subject to sustainability issues for their 
businesses also have proven to be important, as we observed for Indonesia and Kenya. Further, individuals’ 
responses to initiatives can make or break cashless payment efforts. An example is Germany, where a fear 
of data privacy has been an enormous obstacle and, conversely, in Singapore, where McDonald’s no-
choice-but-cashless local strategy helped with consumer acceptance. 
 
27 This happened in the past with Philadelphia National Bank’s strategic venture with its MAC ATM network (Clemons 1990) to 
create “icon services” that other financial firms could add to the offerings at its PLUS Network services – a leading example of a 
growth option that also enabled the banks’ payment platform envelopment (Parker et al. 2016) to expand and support partnering 
for service perfection (Dai and Kauffman 2005) with other leading financial services firms (e.g., the Safaricom-Vodaphone alliance 
and eventually joint ownership of M-PESA in Kenya discussed earlier). More recently, we have seen this with other instances of 
fintech innovations (e.g., with the platform extension of Swish in Sweden to include in-store purchases (also noted earlier), and 
cloud services brokerage (CSB) intermediation in the U.S., a form of corporate service aggregation infomediation (Shang and 
Kauffman 2020). 
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It is important to recognize the growing dominance of platforms for digital banking as well, similar to 
what has been observed for music, movies, loyalty and consumer affinity services, and many supply chain 
applications. Indeed, digital platforms are the essence of the new fintech capabilities (Kauffman 2020b). 
And yet, Shevlin (2019) has argued that “digital platforms are eating banking,” as other articles in this 
special issue generally suggest to be the case. Thus, the reader should recognize that most contemporary 
payments digitalization projects are essentially platformification initiatives. And not everything is likely to 
work out as expected for nations in the process as one may hope (Mas and Rothman 2008).28 
These developments are tied to other issues that have arisen with mass personalization and consumer 
prediction analytics, due to the ubiquitous access that firms today have to big data from their customers. 
How else can a financial services firm better understand consumer behavior than through its customers’ 
digital payment records? Five critical factors are at work that affect collective social values and the nature 
of organizational commitments related to consumers, as noted by Law, Ethics and Informatics researcher, 
Karen Yeung (2019), at Birmingham University in the U.K.:  
“The first three fears are largely concerned [with] the values of fairness and justice, and which can ultimately be 
attributed to the systematic use of digital profiling techniques that apply machine learning algorithms to merged 
sets of data collected from the digital traces generated from continuously tracking users’ online behaviour to 
make calculated predictions about individuals across a population. The remaining two fears coalesce around 
concerns for social solidarity and loss of community that may be associated with the increasing personalisation 
of services and offerings, which is both fuelling and being fuelled by, an increasingly narcissistic mindset that 
mass personalisation makes possible.” 
Other recent research is clarion in its call for consumers, business executives and government regulators 
to address the many different moves that are underway around the globe related to platform services, 
machine algorithms, and potentially invasive predictive intelligence that has become increasingly possible 
with the information-drive transformation of processes, industries and society (Clemons et al. 2017).29  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Today, we are increasingly witnessing the use of technology to create new opportunities for cashless 
payments, as well as a critical reckoning in global industry on the importance of firm-level, local 
environments and national-level infrastructure digitalization strategies – especially access to borderless 
markets (Wald et al. 2019) and the platformization of financial services. Mobile and contactless 
 
28 Daniel Gozman further pointed out at a recent Fintech Forum in Zurich (November 2020) that financial services is likely to 
experience new monopoly and anti-competitive position and power problems, as leading banks jockey to reintermediate the roles 
of some of the new start-up fintechs in the PSP marketplace, by seeking to create ownership and control around platform-related 
APIs and new product and service functionality. These things are repositioning them for greater strategic centrality in subsector 
competition, and the record going forward is unlikely to suggest that regulatory authorities in various countries will be successful 
in shifting the power balance toward fair value-sharing and effective platform monitoring (Kauffman 2020b).   
 
29 A valuable source of knowledge in this respect is the multi-decade research program of Clemons (2019), for the ways that firms 
have been empowered by the technological bases and sociotechical infrastructures that are available to implement strategy.  
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technologies have supported convenience and speed for consumers and merchants in payment transaction-
making. Together with effective national infrastructures, these technologies have allowed developing 
countries to begin reaching the unbanked segments of their populations – thus addressing the issue of 
inclusive finance in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 (Citigroup 2017, United 
Nations 2020). They also have permitted developed countries to begin to convert low-value transactions in 
less-digitalized environments to cashless ones. 
We have addressed the set of high-level research questions to signal the importance of this work to 
industry practitioners and researchers, with the following outcomes of this research commentary article:  
• (RQ1) We classified cashless payment solution implementations using a framework that identifies 
the extent of the development of the national infrastructure, the level of digitalization of local retail 
payment implementation environments, and the relative novelty of payment technology solutions 
that are implemented in a country. 
• (RQ2) Our framework was constructed in three dimensions that distinguish between national and 
local-level infrastructure, based on commonly-accepted constructs and readily-available measures 
from leading government, business and university sources, with classification metrics from 
authoritative sources such as the WEF’s infrastructure rankings. 
• (RQ3) The 3-D framework identifies dimensions related to: the level of development of a country’s 
infrastructure; the digitalization of the local implementation setting where a cashless payment 
solution occurs; and the degree of technological novelty associated with the payment solution at 
the time of its implementation in a country. We have argued that these are useful for beginning to 
more fully understand the success factors and problem areas across the county facets – even though 
not all implementation environments in a country will be representative of the country overall. 
6.1. Summary of Contributions 
Governments and PSPs need to gain a better understanding of the challenges involved in cashless 
payment implementations. Our research has highlighted many of them related to the country facets of our 
3-D classification framework for both developed and developing nations. Forward-looking payment 
solution approaches, it appears, must be applied to overcome the inevitable barriers to successful 
implementation that are likely to exist. Our proposed framework can help to provide new insights as 
countries and payment providers seek clarity about their cashless payment technology-related strategies in 
the classification facets, and should be a useful contribution for other practitioners and researchers who are 
studying the mechanics of technology innovation uptake and implementation related to the “Fintech  
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Revolution”  (Gomber et al. 2018, Gozman et al. 2018).30   
This research, more broadly, contributes to our research knowledge about technology implementation 
in different kinds of developing and developed nation settings. The primary actionable insight that we offer 
for others – researchers and practice managers alike – is the analytical distinction between the local and 
national environments, and why they are needed to identify appropriate success strategies for 
implementation. The standard interpretation in most university research is more of an “either-or”  
dichotomy. Either the goal is to understand what drives technology innovation and diffusion at the national 
level, or the goal is to understand what makes implementation success possible at the local level. Rarely 
have we seen research center studies, agency reports, and consulting white papers on technology 
implementation guides that attempt to bring together both of those levels though. This article has attempted 
to do that. 
So, in a sense, our research in this project has been an effort to bridge the gap that remains in how 
business leaders should reconsider their approach to cashless payment solution implementation in view of 
the potentially different degrees of local digitalization and national infrastructure development to support 
new technology innovations in the digital economy. Indeed, there seems to have been more effort in  
disparate disciplines. These include: the local and national energy policy arena (Batel and Devine-Wright 
2015, Kostika and Hobbs 2012, Wu et al. 2017); the risk management and regulatory practices of regional 
and national banks (BIS 2017, World Bank Group 2019); rural and urban healthcare services, including 
the recent COVID-19 pandemic (Haggstrom et al. 2019, OECD 2020b); and local and national telecom 
services effects (Philip et al. 2017, Sandhu and Raja 2019). These all are inareas of research and policy 
interest.  
Other insights from this study highlight the common obstacles. They include issues in attempting to 
displace currently acceptable solutions, extra costs involved in cashless payments, and a range of user 
needs – whether the user is a consumer, vendor or merchant. First, if the current solution is very 
convenient, fast and accessible, as with accessible and fast-delivering Indian stores, and due to the low 
crime rate and secure bank notes in Singapore, then there is less likelihood of success. Second, costs from 
many sides can prohibit implementation, such as the cost of payment technology, transaction fees and 
high merchant discount rates, as in Thailand and Japan. The needs of any stakeholder can also impact 
success. Consumers may have data privacy and security concerns, but need faster checkouts or have 
cultural sensitivities to seeking non-cash alternatives like debt in Germany, for example. Merchants also 
have concerns including tax audits, and finding space for hardware and training on new technology, such 
 
30 Fintech innovations that are on the “global radar” related to payments include digital currencies (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum) 
(BIS 2015), distributed ledger technology (DLT), digital assets (Arner et al. 2019), and fintech remittance services (World Bank 
and IMF 2018).  
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as in Thailand and Singapore. Vendors need a value proposition for implementing and maintaining 
cashless systems. 
In addition, it is valuable for this research to have offered a 3-D framework. Although it is visually 
complex, it also has the potential to be more analytically inclusive, while offering its users opportunities to 
create multiple 2 x 2 (2-D) analysis matrices as they are needed, by holding the third dimension fixed. 
(Again, see Appendix B for exploded views of the developed and developing country infrastructure status, 
which can be used for separate and fuller analysis.) With this in mind, it becomes possible to examine 
technology acceptance issues when the local implementation digitalization environment is held fixed – or 
when technology solution novelty is held constant. Our choice in the present work was to focus on holding 
the national infrastructure status of a country fixed – either for developing or developed countries – so it 
was possible to examine cases that are related to the other two dimensions of the analysis cube.   
6.2. Limitations  
In closing, it is important to discuss possible limitations of this research for both of our intended 
audiences. First, the issue of framework robustness is a well-known concern in the research literature of 
many disciplines in Social Science. The main idea is that a classification should be relatively complete – 
in the sense that it should be hard to add to or adjust for different classificatory dimensions to address 
other kinds of case settings beyond those that have been presented. Yet, the reader should recognize that it 
is possible to add or consider other dimensions to change the overall nature of the country classification.  
A natural addition, for example, is to consider cashless payment solution implementations in high versus 
low financial-regulation economies. Most countries, such as China, Kenya, Singapore, and the European 
countries (among others we selected), are all subject to extensive financial regulation. Thus, close 
regulation seems to be the dominant force at work almost everywhere, prompted by central banks’ view 
that national payment systems are essential as publicly-available networks, and the benefits they yield for 
society – even if some have private ownership, like the large international branded card networks of Visa 
and Mastercard, among others (Weinberg 1996, Carstens 2019).    
Second, we should point out that the amount of source material and interview opportunities for the mini-
cases available was more limited for some countries than for others. As a result, we brought a deeper level 
of informedness in our research inquiry to this project for some regions and countries (e.g., more for 
Western Europe, all of Asia and the Americas, but less for Africa and the Middle East). And yet, our goal 
was not to develop full individual case studies or perform advanced quantitative analysis. So, the 
information access that we obtained was typically sufficient, although not uniform in terms of the amount 
of information available. Further, machine-based methods are often used to conduct co-citation analyses 
of the relevant literature for a study based on the validation of their content-consistency – in terms of 
constructs, variables, moderating drivers, and so on. For example, text analytics can be applied to identify 
 37 
underlying theme-frequency in written source material, among other things. It was not possible for us to 
do this in this research though. We lacked sufficient materials to make this effective and worthwhile. 
Finally, it is important in comparative analysis to consider cultural similarities and differences across 
nations (Au and Kauffman 2008, Takada and Jain 1991), geospatial connectedness (Techatassasoontorn 
and Kauffman 2005, Kauffman and Techatassasoontorn 2009), influences of different socio-technical set-
ups (Geels 2002), and the impacts of political regimes. The latter includes, for example, the effects of 
democratic, constitutional-oligarchic, electoral-autocratic, and authoritarian governments (Wigell 2007), 
as well as the Alt-Right on fintech innovations (Mavadiya 2017). Other issues are: varying 
entrepreneurship support (Andrews et al. 2018); incentives for new technology investment and economic 
development (Mies 2019); and intertemporal differences in value flows in start-up innovations (Banerjee 
et al. 2012, Kauffman and Wang 2008). We will leave these things for others to explore further. 
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APPENDIX A. CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK TERMS 





The extent to which local business environment can effectively support innovative 
payment systems implementation. Also a function of the physical setting, its 
experience with payment technologies, the digitalization of the implementing vendor, 
and the merchants and consumers that will use it, as well as the training and 
educational levels of staff that will need to deal with novel technology 
implementations. 
Payment technology  
solution novelty 
The nature of the payment system solution that is to be supported, based on whether it 
involves complex and high-performance payment services, which are new and 
different for the country or the locality in which the implementation is being done. 
Emphasizes “relative newness” in a setting – typically a higher-technology solution vs. 
a lower-technology solution – that drives payment services at the PoS, and not used 
before. 
National infrastructure  
development status 
An indicator for the readiness of a country as a whole (not its local readiness or 
digitalization, which may be different) to successfully support innovative payment 
capabilities, based on its development level. National infrastructure is an 
operationally-definable basis in assessing global competitiveness, as an enabler of 
innovation and efficiency. 
 
APPENDIX B. EXPLODED VIEWS TO SHOW THE SLICES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT STATUS 
 







         
